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Abstract
We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which
selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms
is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the
designer or the society is the only framework, among all oligopolistic regulatory
models, where Bayesian approach is indispensable.
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1 Introduction
Implementation is designing mechanisms (game forms) through which nonco-
operative actions of agents in a society yield to a set of equilibrium allocations
(or allocation rules) which coincides with the set of social choice functions.
In situations where the number of agents is greater than one, the equi-
librium concepts according to which a game can be resolved are not unique,
giving rise to the problem of selecting the most desirable (simple) solution
concept, hence the implementation technique it will induce, from the view-
point of the designer or the society, depending upon the distribution of in-
formation in the society as well as the mode of behaviour that the agents
∗The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial supports of Scientific and
Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) and Center for Economic Design
(CED). The usual disclaimer applies.
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in the society are endowed with. Among many alternatives, implementation
in dominant equilibrium which requires no information on the part of any
agent or the designer about the characteristics of agents in the society when
determining his or her strategy is, of course, the most desirable one. Besides,
whenever a mechanism is designed to implement in dominant equilibrium,
‘rational’ agents ex-post behave in the way the designer (or the mechanism)
ex-ante predicts them to do. Moreover, whenever the social choice rule can
be implemented in dominant equilibrium, the designer can restrict himself by
the Revelation Principle w.l.o.g. to direct-revelation mechanisms which ask
all agents to report their characteristics and which give them no incentives to
lie, making the strategy (message) space, and thus the mechanism, as simple
as possible. (See Gibbard and Satterthwaite (1977), Dasgupta, Hammond
and Maskin (1979), Harris and Townsend (1981) and Myerson (1979), among
others.)
If a particular social choice rule is desired to satisfy Pareto eﬃciency and
non-dictatorship, which are minimal requirements that can be imposed on
a social choice rule regarding the distribution of power among the agents,
then implementation in dominant equilibrium is, unfortunately, impossible,
as shown by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), when the domain of
agents’ preferences over the feasible outcomes is unrestricted (or suﬃciently
rich). This negative result in implementation under universal domain makes
it inevitable either to work in suﬃciently restricted domains or to use imple-
mentation in other solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium or Bayesian
(Nash) equilibrium, for which the impossibility result does not prevail under
some conditions.
Nash equilibrium concept requires a strategy to be in equilibrium if no
agent has any incentive to change his or her strategy unilaterally whenever
all other agents stick to their equilibrium strategies. Under this solution
concept, an agent needs to know not only his own characteristics (and his
preference relation associated with his characteristics) but the characteristics
(and hence preferences) of everyone else in order to determine his equilibrium
strategy. Maskin (1977, 1985) showed that a social choice rule is Nash imple-
mentable only if it is monotonic. Furthermore, if for a given set of preference
proﬁles of agents in the society, the social choice rule satisﬁes monotonicity
and weak no-veto power conditions, then it is Nash implementable whenever
the number of agents is at least three. (See Maskin (1977, 1985), Williams
(1984), Saijo (1988), Moore and Repullo (1990), Danilov (1993)). Whenever,
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the number of agents is two, no Pareto optimal social choice rule is Nash
implementable under the universal domain of preference proﬁles unless it is
dictatorial (Maskin (1977) and Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978)). The charac-
terization of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions, so called condition β, for
two-person Nash implementation is due to Dutta and Sen, who showed that
on restricted domains, such as economic environments or “cardinal utility,
lottery” framework, one can avoid the impossibility result. (See also Roberts
(1979) and Laﬀont and Maskin (1982)).
Bayesian equilibrium concept (due to Harsanyi (1967-68)) is basically an
extension of Nash equilibrium to a case in which each agent only knows his
preferences and has incomplete information about the preferences of everyone
else. Each agent has a belief about the preferences of other agents, which
is assumed to be originating from the same and commonly known prior. A
strategy proﬁle is then said to be in Bayesian equilibrium if every agent’s
strategy under his or her beliefs about the other agents preferences (and
hence strategies) conditional upon his preferences, is in Nash equilibrium. It
was shown by Ledyard (1978) that in classical economic environments with
a ﬁnite number of agents, there exists no mechanism which implements any
given social choice rule in Bayesian equilibrium and which satisﬁes no-trade
option (individual-rationality) and Pareto eﬃciency for all prior beliefs about
the state of the society. Nevertheless, it is also shown by Jackson (1991)
that if in an economic environment, a social choice function satisﬁes the
necessary conditions, namely, closure, incentive-compatibility and Bayesian
monotonicity then it is implementable in Bayesian equilibrium. (See also
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1987, 1989)).
In the literature where Bayesian approach has been used, the social ob-
jective function is deﬁned as the expected value (under the common prior
belief about the preferences of all agents) of what the society would agree
upon as to maximize under the complete information situation. It is ob-
vious that whenever the social choice rule associated with an actual social
objective function chosen under the complete information case can be im-
plemented in some equilibrium concept, then the common prior belief (of
the designer or the society) about the preference proﬁle of agents is incon-
sequential to the outcomes induced by the selected mechanism whether the
equilibrium concept is Bayesian or not. However, in situations where there
exists no equilibrium concept in which the social choice rule that would be
selected under complete information can be implemented, the Bayesian ap-
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proach which avoids from the impossibility result by redeﬁning the social
objective function and hence its associated social choice rule seems to be the
only appropriate and meaningful solution.
The Bayesian approach in oligopoly regulation has been introduced by
Baron and Myerson (1982) who examined the problem of regulating a natural
monopoly with unknown costs. They showed that when the social objective
function assigns equal weights to both consumers’ and producer’s welfare, the
socially eﬃcient outcome that would be chosen under complete information
can be implemented by a mechanism in dominant equilibrium. Whenever,
the society assigns more weight to consumers’ welfare than producer’s wel-
fare, however, the socially eﬃcient outcome that would be chosen under full
information case is no longer implementable by any mechanism, even though
the domain of admissible preferences of the ﬁrm is very thin; so in such a
case redeﬁning the social objective in the Bayesian sense becomes inevitable.
An important point to note is that in the monopoly regulation prob-
lem as well as in any generalized principal-agent framework where there is
a single agent with private information, every equilibrium concept accord-
ing to which the implementation will take place reduces to the singleton,
namely, single agent’s utility maximization. So, the Bayesian approach in
a principal-agent framework is inevitable as the only normative approach
when the social objective function favors principal’s welfare. However, when
the number of players in any game under incomplete information is greater
than one, we can talk about some conjectural equilibrium concepts as well.
The lack of a general characterization result for dominant (equilibrium) im-
plementation, therefore, does not restrict us completely. Indeed, to make a
justiﬁable generalization of the inevitability of Bayesian implementation in
the principle-agent framework to a multi-agent (oligopoly) model, one needs
to show that there exists no equilibrium concept in which the social choice
rule that would be chosen under complete information in a multi-agent model
can be implemented.
Of course, one may argue at this point that the existence of non-Bayesian
mechanisms in a multi-agent framework does not necessarily imply that one
can avoid Bayesian mechanisms under all circumstances, as each equilibrium
concept, except for dominant equilibrium, may be meaningful and valid for
only a particular informational structure of the society. That is, Bayesian
implementation may be still the only appropriate approach if the agents have
incomplete information about each other’s relevant characteristics.
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But, it should be also noticed that even in environments where agents
completely know each other and thus may be induced to play their Nash
strategies through a non-Bayesian mechanism yielding to an ex-post eﬃcient
social outcome, a designer who has incomplete information about the state
of the society may enforce a Bayesian mechanism, by redeﬁning the social
objective as maximizing the expected value of the social welfare function, the
society has agreed upon, in the presence of his prior beliefs about the state
of the society. The Bayesian nature of the mechanism, however, may lead
to ex-post ineﬃcient outcomes as well as render the mechanism open to the
manipulation of a dishonest regulator whenever his beliefs are not common
knowledge.1
In the light of the criticisms raised in the literature against Bayesian im-
plementation, it is then a natural attitude to ﬁnd out the cases in which
Bayesian implementation is indispensable. This paper attempts to consid-
ers the justiﬁability of Bayesian regulatory mechanisms in a special kind of
economic environment, namely, an oligopoly.
Section 2 presents implementation in general environments. Section 3,
discusses oligopoly regulation as a special kind of implementation problem.
Section 4 contains results on Nash implementation in our oligopolistic frame-
work, and ﬁnally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Implementation in General Environments
Consider an environment in which there are a ﬁnite number, n, agents. Let A
denote the set of alternatives (outcomes) for the agents. A utility function,
u, on A is a real-valued function from A to ℜ (reals). Let U i is the set
of all utility functions for the agent i = 1, ..., n. An n-person social choice
correspondence (SCC) on U = (U1, ..., Un) is a correspondence F : U →→ A,
which lists the desirable outcomes depending upon the utility proﬁle of the
society.
A mechanism (or a game form) Γ = (M,h) is a pair consisting of a
strategy (message) space M = M1 × ... × Mn and an outcome function
1The manipulability of Bayesian mechanisms was pointed out by many authors, in-
cluding Crew and Kleindorfer (1986), Vogelsang (1988), Koray and Sertel (1990), Laffont
(1994) and Koray and Saglam (1995a,b).
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h : M → A. Given the proﬁle u ∈ U of the society, the mechanism Γ leads
to a normal form game Γ[u].
Finally, σ is a solution concept according to which the game Γ[u] is re-
solved.
A mechanism Γ fully implements a social choice rule F if the following
diagram commutes, i.e., h(σ(Γ[u])) = F (u) for all u ∈ U .
σΓ[u]  σ(Γ[u])
F
u  F (u) ⊂ AU ∋


h
Diagram 1
3 Oligopoly Regulation
We will now introduce a regulatory mechanism design problem for an oligopo-
listic market as a special kind of the construction in Section 2. Consider a
single-product industry consisting of a (nonempty) ﬁnite set N = {1, ..., n}
of ﬁrms.
The set of alternatives A is given by
A = {(q, t) ∈ [0, q¯]n × [tl, tu]n |
∑
i∈N
qi ≤ q¯, and
∑
i∈N
ti ≤ tu},
where q¯ > 0 is the maximum amount of industry output, and tl and tu
are respectively the lower and upper bounds of the set of feasible transfers,
which bounds will be characterized later. The ith component qi of q ∈ [0, q¯)n
represents the output level of ﬁrm i and the ith component ti of t ∈ [tl, tu]n,
the transfer made to ﬁrm i from the consumers in the presence of the output
vector q for each i ∈ N .
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We assume that each ﬁrm i ∈ N has a cost function Ci(θi, qi) where θi is
the private cost parameter of the ﬁrm i which is known to lie in the interval
Θi = [θi0, θ
i
1] with θ
i
0 < θ
i
1 for all i ∈ N . The form of the cost function C
i(., .)
for all i ∈ N is assumed to be common knowledge, so all possible states of the
society are given by Θ = Θ1× ...×Θn. We further assume that2 Ci(θi, 0) = 0
and Ciqi > 0, C
i
θi > 0, C
i
qi,θi > 0, and C
i
qi,qi > 0 for all i ∈ N at all q
i ∈ [0, q¯)
and θi ∈ Θi.
Let P (Q) be the inverse demand function of our oligopoly, where P is
continuous, decreasing and concave in the total output Q =
∑
i∈N q
i ∈ [0, q¯)
produced by N . Moreover we assume that P (q¯) = 0.
The net gain of each ﬁrm i ∈ N is given by
NPGi(θi; q, ti) = P (Q)qi − C i(θi, qi) + ti, (1)
leading to the total net producers’ gain
NPG(θ; q, t) =
∑
i∈N
NPGi(θi; q, ti), (2)
while the net consumers’ gain is
NCG(θ; q, t) =
∫ Q
0
(P (x)− P (Q))dx−
∑
i∈N
ti. (3)
Now we deﬁne the set of feasible transfer payments as [tl, tu] = [t¯− z −
ǫ, t+ ǫ] where ǫ > 0 and
t¯ = −max
i
max
θi
max
q
P (Q)qi − C i(θi, qi)
t = −min
i
min
θi
min
q
P (Q)qi − Ci(θi, qi)
z = max
θi
max
q
u2(θ2; (q2, tu))
As usual, we deﬁne the social welfare function as of the form
SW (θ; q, t) = NCG(θ; q, t) + αNPG(θ; q, t)
=
∫ Q
0
P (x)dx−
n∑
i=1
C i(θi, qi) − (1− α)NPG(θ; q, t) (4)
2We also assume that demand and cost functions are such that it is socially optimal to
allow all firms to produce under complete information.
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with α ∈ [0, 1]. For any α ∈ [0, 1], Fα : Θ →→ A is the social choice corre-
spondence where for each θ ∈ Θ, Fα(θ) is the set of alternatives in A which
maximize the social welfare function SW (θ; ., .) subject to the participation
(individual rationality) constraints for consumers and for each producer, re-
spectively,
NCG(θ; q, t) ≥ 0, (5)
NPGi(θ; q, ti) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N. (6)
Formally,
Fα(θ) = {argmax
(q,t)∈A
SW (θ; q, t)|(5) and (6) hold}. (7)
Using (4) we obtain
Fα(θ) = {(q, t) ∈ A|P (Q) = C
i
qi(θ
i, qi), and (8)
(1− α)NPGi(θ; q, t) = 0, ∀i}
Both Loeb and Magat (1979) and Baron and Myerson (1982) (B-M)
showed that when n = 1 in our setting (i.e., when the market is monopoly)
the social choice correspondence Fα can be implemented if α = 1. Later
Koray and Saglam (1995a, 1995b) showed that α = 1 is both a necessary
and a suﬃcient condition for the social choice rule of a similar yet more gen-
eral form as Fα to be implementable in a non-Bayesian equilibrium under a
generalized principle-agent framework which includes B-M model as a special
case. To avoid the negative result arising when α ∈ [0, 1), B-M introduced a
Bayesian regulator who implements a second-best social choice rule associated
with an expected social welfare function.
Later, Saglam (1997) extended the Bayesian approach of B-M to an
oligopoly consisting n ≥ 2 ﬁrms. Koray and Saglam (1995a, 1995b) showed
that in the Bayesian regulation model of B-M as well as in any Bayesian
principal-agent framework, a non-benevolent regulator can manipulate the
mechanism the society expects him to design and hence obtain dishonest
gains by misrepresenting his beliefs whenever they are not veriﬁable, since
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there exists admissible beliefs the designer may choose which are almost3 best
or worst in either ex-ante or ex-post sense from the viewpoint of consumers
(principal) and (or) the producer (agent). Therefore, if the possibility of
such an opportunistic behaviour of regulators are not taken into considera-
tion in designing Bayesian mechanisms, the realized outcome of the selected
mechanism may be totally diﬀerent from what the traditional theory predicts
unless the regulator has a belief which is commonly agreed and veriﬁed by the
society, which is a condition too strong to be held under many circumstances.
Note that in the situation where n = 1 all the equilibrium concepts reduce
to a single agent’s utility maximization. So, the Bayesian implementation,
inspite of all the existing criticisms, is inevitable and seems to be the only
normative approach in a natural monopoly regulation when α = 1, owing to
the negative result in non-Bayesian implementation. However, when number
of players in any environment with incomplete information is greater than
one, to make a generalization of the negative result for the monopoly case
to the (nondegenerate) oligopoly case, one needs to show that there exists
no equilibrium concept via which the social choice correspondence Fα in the
oligopolistic market can be implemented.
As a natural but not necessarily complete step to arrive at a conclusion as
to whether Bayesian implementation is indispensable in oligopolistic markets,
in what follows, we will consider implementation through Nash equilibrium,
which is the most intensely used solution concept in the literature.
4 Results
We have already discussed that in a monopolistic market (i.e., n = 1) the
SCC Fα is not implementable unless α = 1.
We will now check whether Fα is Nash implementable in a ‘literally’
oligopolistic market (i.e., n > 1). We have to consider two cases, namely
n = 2 and n ≥ 3, separately as the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
Nash implementation are diﬀerent in those two cases.
3Although the best belief from the viewpoint of the principal or the worst belief from
the viewpoints of both the principal and agent, hence the society, are not admissible in
an incomplete information as they are in the form of a Dirac function, there exists some
admissible beliefs which lead to, for almost all possible states of the society, almost same
(arbitrarily close) welfare implications on the part of both the principal and the agent.
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4.1 Implementation with Three or More Firms
Definition 1: (Maskin (1977, 1985)) An SCC f satisﬁes weak no-veto power
if, for all (u1, ..., un) ∈ U 1 × ... × Un and a ∈ A, a ∈ F (u1, ..., un) whenever
there exists i such that for all j = i and all b ∈ A, uj(a) ≥ uj(b).
Definition 2: ( Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) and Moulin and Peleg
(1982)) An SCC f is monotonic if, for all (u1, ..., un), (u¯1, ..., u¯n) ∈ U1×...×Un
and a ∈ A, a ∈ f (u¯1, ..., u¯n) whenever (i) a ∈ f(u1, ..., un) and, (ii) for all
b ∈ A and i, ui(a) ≥ ui(b) implies u¯i(a) ≥ u¯i(b).
Theorem: (Maskin (1977, 1985)) Suppose that f is an n-person SCC. If
n ≥ 3 and f satisfies weak no-veto power and monotonicity, then it is fully
implementable.
It is known that in economic environments the Pareto correspondence,
which selects all Pareto optima corresponding to a given utility proﬁle, is
Nash implementable. Note that weak no-veto power is vacuously satisﬁed
in economic environments as agents cannot be simultaneously satiated at
the same outcome. So to show that Pareto correspondence is Nash imple-
mentable, it is left to check they are monotonic. Let f be the Pareto corre-
spondence in an economic environment. Take u ∈ U and a ∈ f(u). Then a is
Pareto eﬃcient at u. Take u¯ ∈ U such that for all i, and b ∈ A, ui(a) ≥ ui(b)
implies u¯i(a) ≥ u¯i(b) but a /∈ f (u¯). Since f is Pareto correspondence, there
exists some c ∈ A such that u¯i(c) ≥ u¯i(a) for all i and u¯j(c) > u¯j(a) for some
j. Then it must be true that ui(c) ≥ ui(a) for all i and ui(c) > ui(a) for
some j, contradicting that a is Pareto eﬃcient at u.
Now using Maskin’s theorem we will show that the social choice cor-
respondence Fα associated with the oligopoly model in Section 3 is Nash
implementable for all α ∈ [0, 1], whenever n ≥ 3. Let ui(θ; (q, t)) represent
NPGi(θ; q, ti) for all i ∈ N . Note that consumers’ utility function NCG is
common knowledge; thus under any mechanism which implements the social
choice rule Fα consumers do not occur as players, though the social choice
rule depends on their utility function.
Proposition 1: Assume α ∈ [0, 1] and n ≥ 3. Then Fα(.) is implementable
in Nash equilibrium.
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Proof: We will ﬁrst show that Fα satisﬁes weak no-veto power. Let θ ∈ Θ.
Deﬁne a(i) = (q(i), t(i)) ∈ A for all i ∈ N as follows:
P (Q(i)) = −P
′(Q(i))q
i
(i) + C
i
qi(θ
i, qi(i)), t
i
(i) = t
u, qj(i) = t
j
(i) = 0, ∀j = i.
It is obvious that for all i ∈ N and b ∈ A, ui(θ; ai) ≥ ui(θ; b) and for all i = j
we have a(i) = a(j). Thus, no two ﬁrms will agree that any given alternative is
top ranked, since each (most) prefers being a monopolist and to get maximal
amount of transfer. As there are at least three ﬁrms in our oligopolistic
market by assumption, weak no-veto power is (vacuously) satisﬁed.
To check monotonicity condition, we ﬁrst note that Fα coincides with
Pareto correspondence whenever α = 1, (as seen from equation (9)). So F1
is monotonic.
Whenever α ∈ [0, 1), Fα is single-valued and hence it does not coincide
with Pareto correspondence, implying that monotonicity condition should be
checked. Let θ ∈ Θ and x = (q, t) = Fα(θ). Now take any θ1 ∈ Θ such that
θ1 = θ. Then there exists i ∈ N such that θi1 = θ
i. Fix the ﬁrm i. Let
a = (qa, ta), b = (qb, tb) ∈ A be such that4
qia = q
i/2, ui(θ; a) = 0, and
qib = (q
i + q¯)/2, ui(θ; b) = 0.
Now deﬁne c = (qc, tc) as follows:
c =
{
a if θi1 > θ
i
b if θi1 < θ
i
We have ui(θ; x) ≥ ui(θ; c) satisﬁed. Note that
ui(θ1; c) = P (Qc)q
i
c − C
i(θi1, q
i
c) + t
i
c
= C i(θi, qic)−C
i(θi1, q
i
c)
as ui(θ; c) = 0 by construction. Similarly, we have
ui(θ1; x) = C
i(θi, qi)− Ci(θi1, q
i)
4Note that ta, tb ∈ [t
l, tu] guarantees for the existence of such a construction.
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as ui(θ; x) = 0 by the supposition that x = Fα(θ). But then u
i(θ1; x) <
ui(θ1; c) due to the assumption C iθi,qi > 0 and the construction that the sign
of (qic − q
i)(θi1 − θ
i) is negative. Thus, hypothesis (ii) of monotonicity is not
satisﬁed, and therefore the SCC Fα(.) is monotonic.
Since the SCC Fα satisﬁes both monotonicity and weak no-veto power for
all α ∈ [0, 1], by Maskin’s theorem it is implementable in Nash equilibrium
for all α ∈ [0, 1] and n ≥ 3. 
4.2 Implementation in a Duopoly
We will use two-person implementation results by Dutta and Sen (1991) to
show that social choice rule Fα(.) can be implemented in a duopolistic market.
Definition 3: For any i ∈ I, u ∈ U and a ∈ A, let Li(u, a) and SLi(u, a)
denote the sets {c ∈ A|ui(a) ≥ ui(c)} and {c ∈ A|ui(a) > ui(c)}, respectively.
Definition 4: For any i ∈ I , u ∈ U and D ⊆ A, let M i(u,D) denote the
maximal elements in D for agent i according to utility function ui, that is
M i(u,D) = {a ∈ D|ui(a) ≥ ui(d), ∀d ∈ D}.
Definition 5: (Dutta and Sen (1991)) An SCC f satisﬁes Condition β if
there exists a set A∗ which contains the range of f , and for each i ∈ I , u ∈ U
and a ∈ f (u) there exists a set Di(u, a) ⊆ A∗, with a ∈ Di(u, a) ⊆ Li(u, a)
such that for all u1 ∈ U , we have
(i) (a) for all b ∈ f (u1), D1(u, a)∩D2(u1, b) = ∅. (b) Moreover, there ex-
ists x ∈ D1(u, a)∩D2(u1, b) such that if for some u2 ∈ U , x ∈M
1(u2, D
1(u, a))
∩ M 2(u2, D
2(u1, b)), then x ∈ f(u2).
(ii) if a = f(u1), there exists j ∈ I and b ∈ D
j(u, a) such that b /∈ Lj(u1, a).
(iii) [M i(u1, D
i(u, a))\{a}] ∩M j(u1, A∗) ⊆ f(u1) ∀i ∈ I and j = i.
(iv) M1(u1, A∗) ∩M2(u1, A∗) ⊆ f(u1).
Theorem: (Dutta and Sen (1991)) The SCC f is implementable if and only
if it satisfies condition β.
Proposition 2: Assume α ∈ [0, 1] and n = 2. Then Fα(.) is implementable
in Nash equilibrium.
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Proof: Let A∗ = A and θ ∈ Θ. Deﬁne a ≡ (qa, ta) ∈ Fα(θ). Let
D1(θ, x) = {x} ∪ SL1(θ, x) and D2(θ, x) = {x} ∪ SL2(θ, x) for all x ∈ A.
Take any θ1 ∈ Θ, and let b ≡ (qb, tb) ∈ Fα(θ1).
Part 1: Let c ≡ (qc, tc) ∈ A be such that qc = qa and tc < min{ta, tb +
u2(θ1; b)−u2(θ1, (qa, tb))}. We have c ∈ D1(θ, a) since u1(θ, c) = u1(θ; (qa, tc))
= u1(θ; (qa, ta)) + (tc − ta) < u1(θ; a). Moreover, we have c ∈ D2(θ1, b) since
u2(θ1; c) = u2(θ1; (qa, tc)) = u2(θ1; (qa, tb)) + (tc − tb) < u2(θ1; b). So β-(i)-(a)
is satisﬁed. To check β-(i)-(b), note that
M 1(θ2, D
1(θ, a)) =
{
a if θ12 = θ
1
∅ otherwise
and
M2(θ2, D
2(θ1, b)) =
{
b if θ22 = θ
2
1
∅ otherwise
It is clear that a = b if and only if θ = θ1 since Cθi,qi > 0. Thus,
M1(θ2,D
1(θ, a)) ∩M2(θ2, D
2(θ1, b)) =
{
a if θ2 = θ1 = θ
∅ otherwise
If θ2 = θ1 = θ, then M 1(θ2, D1(θ, a)) ∩ M 2(θ2, D2(θ1, b)) = a ∈ Fα(θ2).
Therefore, β-(i)-(b) is also satisﬁed.
Part 2: Take θ1 ∈ Θ such that a /∈ Fα(θ1). Since Cθi,qi > 0 for all i by
assumption, we must have θ1 = θ, and so there exists some j such that
θj1 = θ
j. Take such a ﬁrm j. Note that
uj(θ1; (q, t)) = u
j(θ; (q, t)) + Cj(θj, qj)− Cj(θj1, q
j).
Let qd be such that
qjd =
{
qja/2 if θ
j
1 > θ
j,
(qja + q¯)/2 if θ
j
1 < θ
j.
Denote K = Cj(θj, qjd)−C
j(θj1, q
j
d)− [C
j(θj , qja)−C
j(θj1, q
j
a)]. We know that
K is positive since sign(θj1 − θ
j)(qd − qa) < 0, and C
j
θj ,qj > 0. There exists
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some td ∈ R
n such that −K < uj(θ; (qd.td)) − u
j(θ; a) < 0. Take such a
transfer td and deﬁne d ≡ (qd, td). We note that d ∈ Dj(θ, a). Now we have
uj(θ1; d)− u
j(θ1; a) = u
j(θ;d)− uj(θ; a)
+Cj(θj, qjd)− C
j(θj1, q
j
d)− [C
j(θj, qja)−C
j(θj1, q
j
a)]
≥ 0,
implying that d /∈ Lj(θ1, a). Therefore, β-(ii) is satisﬁed.
Part 3: Take any i. Note that for j = i, we have M j(θ1, A
∗) = (q, t) such
that qi = ti = 0, P (qj) = −P ′(qj)qj + Cqj (θ1, q
j) and tj = tu. We also have
M i(θ1, D
i(θ, a)) =
{
a if θi1 = θ
i
∅ otherwise.
Thus [M i(θ1, Di(θ, a))\a] ∩M j(θ1, A∗) = ∅, for all i and j = i. Therefore,
β-(iii) is (vacuously) satisﬁed.
Part 4: We have M i(θ1, A
∗) = (q(i), t(i)) such that q
j
(i) = t
j
(i) = 0 for
j = i, P (qi(i)) = −P
′(qi(i))q
i
(i) + Cqi(i)(θ1, q
i
(i)) and t
i
(i) = t
u. Thus M1(θ1,A∗) ∩
M2(θ1, A∗) = ∅. Therefore, β-(iv) is (vacuously) satisﬁed.
Since condition β is satisﬁed, Fα is Nash implementable for all α ∈ [0, 1],
whenever n = 2. .
5 Conclusions
Bayesian implementation, or rather changing the social objectives in Bayesian
sense, may be the only possible solution, even in situations where all agents
in the society but the designer have the complete information about the
state of the society, if the ex-post socially eﬃcient outcome can not be im-
plemented in any equilibrium concept. In this study, we showed that in
oligopolistic markets with at least two ﬁrms this is certainly not the case,
and hence Bayesian implementation in oligopoly regulation is not inevitable
under all circumstances regarding the informational asymmetries among the
ﬁrms about the state of the market. Indeed, the monopoly market where
14
consumers are favored by the designer or the society, is the only oligopolistic
framework where Bayesian implementation is indispensable.
As a future research one may consider the problem of implementing social
optima in oligopolies when demand is unknown. One may also extend the
results of this paper to a general principal-multi agent framework.
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